Luther Seminary

Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary
Faculty Publications

Faculty & Staff Scholarship

2006

Practical Theology as Social Ethical Action in
Christian Ministry: Implications from Emmanuel
Levinas and Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Andrew Root
Luther Seminary, aroot@luthersem.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Ethics in Religion Commons, Practical Theology Commons, and the Religious
Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
Root, Andrew, "Practical Theology as Social Ethical Action in Christian Ministry: Implications from Emmanuel Levinas and Dietrich
Bonhoeffer" (2006). Faculty Publications. 54.
http://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles/54

Published Citation
Root, Andrew. “Practical Theology as Social Ethical Action in Christian Ministry: Implications from Emmanuel Levinas and Dietrich
Bonhoeffer.” International Journal of Practical Theology 10, no. 1 (2006): 53–75. https://luthersem.idm.oclc.org/
login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rfh&AN=ATLA0001611986&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty & Staff Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. For more information, please contact
akeck001@luthersem.edu.

Practical Theology as Social Tthical Action
in Christian M inistry
Implicati(}ns from Em m anuel Levinas and D ietrich Bonhoeffer
A ndrew R oot

Introduction
Practical theology, unlike the other th eological disciplines, specifically
directs itself tow ard the contem porary m om ent. It puts the church’s historical th eological con fession s in con versation w ith the present conflicts
and con tem p lation s o f the contem porary church and the larger society
in w h ich it is foun d, op en ing lines o f m utual con versation and critique.
Practical th eology has argued that th eology is in con tinu al and con stant
d evelopm en t, m oving and advancing w ith in this convergence o f past reflection and present con fron tation . As the church con tinu es m inistering in
the w orld , so to o m ust its th eology con tinu e to develop and transition. I
assert in this article that the con tex t for com tru ctin g C hristian th eo lo g y
can on ly be the church’s m inistry in the w orld . I w ill con ten d that the
m inistry o f the church in the w orld is w h at provides both the co n tex t
and the m aterial for in tention ally constructing theology.
If C hristian m inistry is the co n tex t and m aterial for C hristian theology, how ever, w e m ust ask, w h a t is ministry? I am suggesting that, at its
heart, m inistry is ethical action for the other w h o is both near and far
neighbor. To m ake this p oin t, I w ill lo o k to Em m anuel Levinas. I argue
that if th eology is done as practical theology, deliberately uniting theory
and practice, it avoids the problem s that Levinas sees w ith the discipline
and m akes it p ossib le to use his p h ilosop h y in constructing a practical
th eology for the other.1

1

Levinas himself supports this task of melding theory and practice, asserting that on
the road of ethical action one confronts the transcendent metaphysical other. “The
traditional opposition between theory and practice will disappear before the metaphysical
transcendence by wbicb a relation witb the absolutely otber, or trutb, is establisbed, and
of wbicb etbics is the royal road . ... We sball go furtber, and, at the risk of appearing to
confuse tbeory and practice, deal witb both as modes of metaphysical transcendence.”
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, ?ittsburgh (Duquesne University Press) 1 6 1  و,
29. This wifi be further developed in the remainder of this article.
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I w ill begin by laying out som e o f the m ajor pillars o f L evinas’s th ou ght
before turning direetly to his eritique o f theology. M ak in g Levinas applieable w ill require a C hristologieal reading. I w ill turn to Ray A nderson
and his diseu ssion o f the unity o f th eology and m inistry, sh ow in g the
im portanee o f a trinitarian understanding o f theology. N e x t, to d em onstrate both the p ossib ility and p otential in this kind o f reading, I w ill
plaee Levinas in dialogue w ith D ietrieh Bonhoeffer, first sh ow in g h o w
B on hoeffer’s th eology is itself a praetieal theology, then lo o k in g directly
at sim ilarities b etw een L evinas’s and B on hoeffer’s m ethod s. Finally, I w ill
con clud e by asserting that social ethical responsibility set forth by both
Levinas and B onhoeffer is a paradigm and lo ca tio n for d oing practical
theology.

T he Fillars o f L evinas’s M ethod
L evinas’s p h ilosop h y seeks to correct that w h ich he believes is the error
o f W estern p hilosophy, m ost dram atically en com p assed in the th ou ght
o f his form er p h ilosop h ical m entor, M artin Heidegger. This error is the
tendency for the k now er to think it is p ossib le to them atize the other in
such a w ay as to m ake him or her totalized in his or her being. H ence, I
am able from the p osition o f m y “I” to con ceptu alize, in totality, w h at it
m eans for the other to be the other. I think I can grasp him or her felly,
for I and the other share in the existential state o f our being (w hich for
H eidegger is angst). This totalization can lead on ly to violence, according
to Levinas, never m oving the I to the other in an openness that w o u ld
allow for ethical action for the other.
Totalization op p oses the m etaphysical im pulse w h ich recognizes that
it is im possible for m e to k n o w the other truly (as one m ight k n o w an
object, even in our shared experience), for there is a chasm to o deep
and w id e for m e to cross. An infinity separates us. The uniqueness o f
the other stands over against all thou ghts and categories I have for her.
It is on ly in a con n ection to the other in w h ich I recognize her infinity,
w h ich is the im possibility for m e to grasp and categorize the other, that
the experience o f the transcendent m etaphysical is possible.^ “Infinity is
characteristic o f a transcendent being as transcendent ؛the infinite is the
ab solutely other.”3 The I/o th e r construct, then, becom es the lo ca tio n for
both p h ilosop h ical con tem p lation and religious experience.4

2

3

“Whatever be the extension of my tbougbts, limited by nothing, the Otber cannot be
contained by me: he is unthinkable-he is infinite and recognized as such.” Ibid., 230.
Levinas shows here the infinity of the other and the impossibility of my comprehending
this other. Tbis reality reveals the otber’s transcendence, and in experiencing this other,
1 myself am tbrown into tbe transcendent.
Ibid., 49.
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For this I/o th e r construct to exist and n ot collapse into totalization ,
I and the other m ust m utually and distinctly live as subjects, as egoists.
For Fevinas, the m ost fundam ental exp ression o f o n e’s unique subjective
distinction, w h ich escapes outside cogn ition , is enjoym ent. It is in enjoym ent that I am freely m e, freely I, m ost com p letely in touch w ith myselfA
In m y egoist act o f eating and drinking, I am m ost aw are that I am a
subject, that I am an I that refuses to be totalized. At h om e in m y o w n
space, in the space I call m ine, I recognize the infinity that separates me
from all oth ers . ٤ It is in the enjoym ent o f the I that separation becom es
c le a r / In this separation, I recognize the other as other, im possible to totalize, but one to m eet op en ly and uniquely in his or her o w n enjoym ent
(distinction) in the h ospitality o f m y h om e and table, in co m m u n ion w ith
m y o w n unique hum anity. Enjoym ent alone does n o t presuppose ethical
action, however. It on ly p resupposes that I am free for the other, free as
a differentiated self. Enjoym ent Is preparatory (and rem ains continual)
for ethics, but is n ot itself the con fron ted m om ent. T he enjoying self is
thrust into ethics in seeing the face o f the o th e r/
The face o f the other for Fevinas is m etaphysical. It is b eyond com prehension, b eyond totalization . It is b eyond the o n to lo g ica l forniture o f
m y existence. It can n ot be m oved and organized as I please. T he face o f
other in its nudity and uniqueness calls m e ou t to him , to give all to him ,
to be h ostage and com p letely responsible for him . “T he face has turned
to m e - and this is its very nudity. It is by itself and n ot by reference to
a system . ”و
4
5

6

7

8

و

It is here, anticipating our further discussion, that we see how theory and practice are
linked for Levinas.
Peter Sedgwick continues this thought nicely: “In the light of this Levinas argues that the
individuality of the individual is ‘enacted’ through enjoyment .... The metaphysical Desire
for the Other, in other words, is only possible for a being that is already separated from
others.” Peter Sedgwick, Descartes to Derrida, Malden, Mass (Blackwell) 2001, 188.
“Only a subject that eats can be for-the-other, or can signify. Signification, the-one-for-theother, has meaning only among beings of flesh and blood.” Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise
Than Being or Beyond Essence, Pittsburgh (Duquesne University Press) 174 ,81  و.
“T) love aud to eujoy hy eatiug,
not drawn much attention from Western philosophers. By way of his phenomenology
of terrestrial existence in light of an all-emhracing hedonism, Levinas shows that our
search for happiness is not bad at all hut rather a necessary condition of the possibility
of the self-possession through which the I acquires its autonomous substantiality. In
this still-solitary dimension, the law of life is: Enjoy life as much as possihle.” Adriaan
Peperzak, To the Other. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, West
Lafayette, Ind. (Purdue University Press) 123 ,3  وو.
Levinas explains here how enjoyment leads to “heing-for-the-other.” tie shows that
enjoyment itself has passivity ahout it and it is this passivity that makes true ethical action
possihle. Without passivity, ethics is turned into a program, hence into totalization. “It
is the passivity of heing-for-another, which is possihle only in the form of g iv in g the very
hread I eat. But this one has to first enjoy one’s hread, not in order to have the merit of
giving it, hut in order to give it with one’s heart, to give oneself in giving it. Enjoyment
is an ineluctahle moment of sensibility.” Levinas, Otherwise, 72.
Levinas, Totality, 75.
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It  طn ot, how ever, m asoch istic enm eshm ent that Levinas desires, for
I respond to the other from m y o w n subjective self, from m y differentiated, distinct, enjoying self.10 w h e n I see the face o f the other, how ever,
I can n ot turn aw ay from the other, for the infinite has appeared. To deny
it w o u ld be to deny its possibility, m aking totality operative and transcendence im possible. If on ly totality is a p ossib ility for hum anity, ethics
is im possible, for the other is on ly an item in m y existence and can n ot
place a dem and upon m e, can n ot call m e into r e s^ n sib ility . It is on ly as
the transcendent that he can con fron t m e, for he is w h o lly other from
m y o w n being, from m y o w n egoist, enjoying self. It is in this m om ent o f
practice, o f ethical action , that theory, that p h ilosop h y is m ade k n o w n to
m e. In action alongside the other, truth and objectivity appear.11
I see a face, thou gh, and n ot a silhouette. There can be no pre-planned
or pre-pared ethical actions. There can be no absolutes or foun dation al
ethical ob ligations. To have such w o u ld be to fall into totalization . I see a
face, unique from all others. In seeing it and seeing through it, I see all o f
hum anity. The other m ay be very fam iliar in m y day to day life (parent,
child, sp ouse, colleagu e), but in seeing her as other, I see her as stranger.
In her strangeness, I am opened to the w h o le o f h um anity.^ This other’s
hum anity, this other’s face dem ands m y response-ability. In this concrete
m om ent o f seeing face to face, I m ust respond, I m ust act. In order to see
her truly, to peer deep into the unique beauty o f her face, I m ust enter this
m om ent open, prepared for am biguity, prepared to discover an ew reality
and truth, and to experience as never before, again, the transcendent.
Infinity can n ot be experienced w ith o u t action. Ethics can n ot exist, for
Levinas, w ith ou t resp om ib ility that m oves to substitution. M u tuality is
n ot enough. There m ust be an asym m etrical con n ection b etw een the I and
other.*0 I m ust be w illing and ready to suffer for the other, to give “the
very bread from m y m outh to the other.” w h e n I m eet the other in such
10 “To endure this responsibility, 1 must, however, be someone: an independent being
with an initiative and a concrete existence of its own. W hat are the conditions for
this independence? ... Human selfhood is due to a specific way of commerce with the
surrounding reality: to be an ego means to rise out of the elements and dominate them
from an independent perspective, for example by eating or drinking.” Peperzak, To the
Other, 23.
11 Levinas c o n tin u e s: “The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic
image it leaves me . ... The face brings a notion of truth which, in contradistinction to
contemporary ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression ... . ”
Levinas, Totality, 51.
12 “The other transcends the limits of (self-)consciousness and its horizon; the look and
the voice that surprise me are ‘too much’ for my capacity of assimilation. In this sense,
the other comes toward me as a total stranger and from a dimension that surpasses
me. The otherness of the other reveals a dimension of ‘height’: he/she comes ‘from on
high.’” Peperzak, To the Other, 20.
13 “It is ... an asymmetrical relation - 1am summoned to a responsibility that is not dependent
on reciprocity or equality but on ‘looking up’ to the other.” David F. Ford, Self and
Salvation. Being Transformed, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1999, 37.
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a fashion, I am touched em otion ally by him and I am w illin g to suffer
for him , to stand in his place, in the m ist o f his suffering and tragedy.14
There is n oth ing I can deny the other.^
This does n ot, how ever, preem pt or destroy m y subjective egoist enjoym ent, keeping m e from being a self. Rather, it is in this radical responsibility that I discover m y true hum anity, shaken lo o se from the dusty
ropes o f self-centered m onism . It is on ly in being-for-the-other that I can
be m e, the enjoying self.16 “To realize m y responsibility for the Other, I
m yself m ust be free and in depend en t ؛but the sense o f m y selfh o o d is m y
being-for-the-O ther. ” 17
For Tevinas, in this ethical interaction o f substitution w ith the other,
language becom es o f great im portance. It is language that bridges the
I and the other.18 “ [T]he relation b etw een the sam e and the other ... is
lan gu age.” 19 I can n ot act for the other, I can n ot stand-in for the other,
if I do n ot understand w h at it m eans to be the other. I m ust a llo w her
to teach m e.20 I can on ly escape totalizatio n by m eeting the other in
con versation, in language, in the “sayin g.” This event o f language w ill
14 “T>be-for-an©ther, despite ©neself, but in interrupting the for-©neself, is to take the bread
out of one’s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one’s own fasting. The
for-another characteristic of sensibility is enacted already in the enjoying and savoring,
if we can express ourselves in this way.” Levinas, Otherwise, 56.
15 “The way the other imposes its enigmatic irreducibility and nonrelativity or absoluteness
is by means of a command and a prohibition: You are not allowed to kill me; you must
accord me a place under the sun and everything that is necessary to live a truly human
life. This demands not only the omission of criminal behavior but simultaneously a
positive dedication: the other’s facing me makes me responsible for him/her, and this
responsibility has no limits.” Peperzak, To the Other, 22.
16 Levinas upholds that in a true relationship of substitution, the  لand the other are upheld
in their own unique and distinct humanity, and one’s egoist self is not exploded. “An
exposure to the other, it is signification, is signification itself, the-one-for-the-other to the
point of substitution, but a substitution in separation, that is, responsibility.” Levinas,
Otherwise, 54. He continues this thought: “In substitution my being that belongs to me
and not to another is undone, and it is through this substitution that I am not ‘another,’
but me.” Ibid., 127.
17 Peperzak, To the Other, 25.
18 “How are the selves related in the pluralism which resists totality? The main way is by
language, which can relate across the ‘abyss of separation’ and at the same time confirm
the separation. Levinas even says that ‘the epiphany of the face is wholly language.’
Language is not first of all about a content to be communicated but is rooted in the
orientation to the other, in sincerity and frankness, and in responsibility answerable to
the other.” Ford, $elf, 57.
19 Levinas, Totality, 59.
20 ‘Ho approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at
each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore
to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have
the idea of infinity . ... The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic
relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching
[enseignement]. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and
brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the very epiphany of the
face is produced.” Levinas, Totality, 51.
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call m e deep, n ot in sim ple understanding o f the other, but into incarn ation al substitution for the other.21 In hearing, seeing, and conversing,
the other’s infinity w ill call m e to stand in for her com pletely. W e m ust
a llow language to bridge our w orld s, to inform us and m ove us deeper
in com m itm ent for one another. O ne inform s m e o f w h a t it is to be the
other by “sayin g” SO .22 In the back and forth draw ing out o f the saying m om en t that inform s m e and draw s m e deeper into su bstitution , in
con versation, I realize that I am “elect . ” الI am the elect and ch osen one
to stand in for this o t h e r s
In this section I have used w ord s from Levinas like “tran scend en ce”
and “m etap h ysical” (Levinas also uses “ep ip h an y” often), but it w o u ld
n ot be appropriate to end this section w ith o u t touchin g m ore specifically
on just w h at Levinas m eans by transcendence, or better, h o w one experiences or com es in con tact w ith the transcendent or m etaphysical, i.e.,
G od. For Levinas, discussing G od is unfeasible. G od is transcendent, so
far outside o f being that it is im possible (w e have no language) to speak
o f G od .25 This im possibility keeps G od from any risk o f being totalized.
T he hum an, how ever, can still experience the m etaphysical, can still experience transcendence. This is p ossib le through the face o f the other. In
the ethical act, the hum an partakes in the d iv in e d “Levinas asks in w hich
concrete experience this structure can realize itself. H is response is no
21 “Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me and tbe
Otber, the radical separation in transcendence wbicb prevents the reconstitution of
totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very fact of being in a
conversation consists in recognizing In the Otber a rigbt over tbis egoism, justifying
oneself.” Ibid., 40.
22 “Saying is a denuding, of the unqualifiable one, the pure someone, unique and chosen;
that is, it is an exposedness to the other wbere no slipping away is possible.” Levinas,
Otherwise, 50. Levinas explains here what the conversation (“saying”) can do philosophically
and bow it works to connect us to the other.
23 “‘Face’ is the word Levinas chooses to indicate the alterity of the Other forbidding me to
exercise my narcissistic violence. ‘Language’ is another expression of the same nucleus of
meaning if it is understood as spoken language or discourse and not as a text detacbed
from its autbor. Tbe Other regards me and speaks to me; you are my interlocutor;
Tbe face speaks.’ Tbis is the concrete way in wbicb 1 am in relation with the infinite.”
Feperzak, To the Other, 64.
24 Feperzak explains furtber what Levinas means by election: “I have been chosen, neither
by myself nor by another’s will or decision but by some thing or some no-thing that is
present through the Other who shows me his/her face. I have been chosen to he responsible
for anybody whom 1 sball meet. 1 cannot refuse tbis election, for it has appointed me
as an irreplaceable servant who cannot put this burden on others.” Ibid., 28.
25 “Our language about or to God should be in agreement with the relation of me to the
Other, who is the only ‘place’ where God is revealed. Only from tbis perspective can
one approach God prudently and respectfully. Not, however, simply as an enlargement
of the buman Other; for God is not an other Autrui, but still other tban the buman
Other.” Ibid., 35.
26 “Levinas wifi state ... that the existence of the buman other, because of his/her absolute
otberness (or infinity) is the only possible revelation of God.” Ibid., 109, n.53. “Anotber
looking at me ... signifies the ideal and the divine.” Ibid., I l l , n.62.
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longer sim ply the traditional one o f the Greeks or C hristian th eologian s,
w h o identify the ab solutely O ther w ith the unique C o d above finite beings, but the other hum an. This is n ot to say that G od is suppressed or
ab olish ed . ” الTevinas plaees ethies w ith in the bodily, and the transeendent
w ithin the w o rld .28
We m ust be eau tious, however. The other does n ot b eeom e G od for
Tevinas, nor is G od m ystieally foun d som eh o w b eeom ing the other, as
if helping the other is helping C od or lovin g the other is loving G od.
Rather, the other rem ains the other, and our eo n n eetio n to the other is
eon n eetion to the other only. W e ean n ot allo w our ethies to be distraeted
by our theology. To “love the sinner, but hate the sin ” is in and o f itself
totalization and, ironieally, destroys the p ossib ility o f transeendenee.
Tevinas exp lain s.
The dim ension of the divine opens forth from the hum an face. A relation w ith
the Transcendent free from all captivation by tbe Transcendent is a social
relation. It is bere th at the Transcendent, infinitely otber, solicits us and appeals to us. The proxim ity of the Otber, the proxim ity of the neigbbor, is in
being an ineluctable m om ent of the revelation of an absolute presence (that
is, disengaged from every relation), which expresses itself. His very epipbany
consists in soliciting us by his destitution in the face of the Stranger, the widow,
and the orphan.2؟

W ith som e o f the m ajor pillars o f L evinas’s thou ght n o w in plaee, w e ean
turn to diseussing his disdain for theology.

Levinas’s Critique o f T h eo lo g y
L evinas’s basie eritieism o f th eology is that although it speaks o f the
m etaphysieal and elaim s it reeeives its data from the transeendent, it is n ot
m etaphysieal. Philosophieally, he elaim s that for th eo lo g y to be m etaphysical is an antilogy. T h eology is totalizin g. Its pursuit is to categorize the
other. T hrough cogn ition it elaim s w h o and w here G od is. This project in
and o f itself m akes transeendenee im possible, ironically m aking the th e o 

27 Ihid., 61.
28 “The ‘atheism’ of the will, as a necessary condition for ego’s independence, goes together
with true religion. The question of how ‘the Other’ must be understood receives an answer
in several formulas by which Levinas tries to explain that the relation to the human
Other and the revelation to God coincide completely and without fail. The only way of
having a relation with God - so is his conviction - is to respond to the interpellation of
the human face, to be good. This correspondence is neither a form of participation nor
a parallelism between two worlds; God does not incarnate himself in human beings,
but there is no other relation to God possible than the generous approach of the human
Other in his/her misery. Autrui is the absolute that orients the world and its history.”
Ibid., 144.
29 Levinas, Totality, 78.
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logical task superfluous at best and destructive at w o r s t . “M etaph ysics
is enacted in ethical relations. W ithou t the signification they draw from
ethics, th eological con cepts rem ain em pty and form al f r a m e w o r k s . T h e
th eological task is to lo o k on tologically at G od, outlining G od, asserting
w h at is p ossib le for G od and w h at is not. T h eo lo g y asserts that there is
a divine dram a underway, and in asserting such, the freedom o f the hum an other is lost in the totalizin g project o f the divine. Levinas fears that
w e, that hum anity in our theology, have given G od o n to lo g y that is to o
sim ilar to our o w n ,^ m aking it p ossib le for G od to be p ossessed , keeping G od from being an enjoying subject.^ In other w ord s, for Levinas,
th eology im prisons G od in the reality o f the “ sa id ” rather than in the
m oving, acting, unthem atized reality o f the “sa y in g .” For Levinas, G od
exists n ot in the n oun but the verb.34
30 Ford explains further what Levinas’s objections are to theology: “Tbeology, be says,
thematizes or objectifies what it should not; it is mythological, or suggests tbat tbere is a
divine drama in progress in wbicb people are participants, often unwittingly; it suggests
that it is possible to participate directly in or have cognitive or emotional access to tbe life
of God; it finds intrinsic links between human nature and the divine; it tends to confuse
creation with causality or to conceptualize creation in ontological terms; it makes ontology
absolute, with God as the supreme being and therefore inevitably totalitarian; it argues
analogically from the world to God; it signifies God in terms of presence, action, efficacy
in the world; above all, its alliance with ontology conspires against doing justice to an
ethics wbicb resists the assimilation of the other person to oneself and one’s overview, and
which finds in the face to face an unsurpassable imperative directness and immediacy.”
David F. Ford, On Substitution, in: Facing the Other. The Etbics of Emmanuel Fevinas,
ed. Sean Hand, Richmond Surrey (Cuzon) 123 ,6  وو. Some of Levinas’s prohlems we
wifi he unahle to pacify, yet that is not the pursuit of tbis article. Instead, hy taking bis
critique seriously, I intend to sbow bow his pbilosopbical metbod is helpful to practical
theology.
31 Levinas, Totality, 79.
32 Ford states nicely Levinas’s purpose in relation to God and theology: “Levinas suggests that
the main purpose for the book [Otherwise than Being] is ‘to bear a God uncontaminated
hy B ein g ’, and tbrougb the test tbeology emerges as a discourse that colindes witb the
contamination.” Eord, Self, 50.
33 “Tbeological language rings untrue or hecomes mystical .... As ontological language,
it helongs to the fahric of interests that dominate the state and its religions parallel, the
cburcb. Being incapahle of disinterestedness, theology impedes transcendence. If seen as
an ohject opposite to a tbinking suhject that desires knowledge, God is the fulfillment of
interested (or ‘erotic’) need ... not the Ahsolute to wbicb true desire refers .... Tbis God
is the seducer wbo apes the infinite; he is an enemy of morality and a principle of hate.
The nonontologically understood God is nonpresent: be is not a tbeme, not even in the
form of a ‘Tbou’ witb wbom a dialogue would he possihle. He cannot he known hecause
as noematic correlate, be would immediately he annibilated in the totalizing knowledge
of tbe suhject. Even the question, ‘Does God exist?’ testifies to an irréligions attitude ....
The question helongs in the spbere wbere interests, security, utility, projects and results,
proof and calculations, totality and conatus are at bome. The God wbo is hrougbt to
speecb there is not strong enougb to overcome the deatb of God that cbaracterizes our
times.” Feperzak, To the Otber, 225.
34 “The limits of the present in wbicb infinity hetrays itself hreak up. Infinity is heyond the
scope of the unity of transcendental apperception, cannot he assemhled into a present,
and refuses heing recollected. Tbis negation of the present and of representation finds its
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The “oth er” w h o is them atized and totalized in the th eologieal task
is n ot just G od, but also the hum an other. If one lives and m oves in the
w orld w ith a eategorized G od, one w ill inevitably eategorize his or her
neighbor. D estroying G o d ’s transeendenee w ill result in the destruetion o f
the transcendence o f the hum an other. W ith this transcendence destroyed
(or ignored), ethics becom es im possible. N eith er G od nor the hum an other
is free to place a dem and upon m e, free to elect m e for action. Both G od
and the other becom e static, allow in g m e to be for m yself rather than
for the other.
Tevinas suggests that the m ost theistic stance one can take is to live as
an atheist. This frees one from idolatry and a llo w s for ethical action on
behalf o f the other.^ W ithou t such a stance, w h en the other approaches
m e I am n ot free to give m yself to him , but m ust stop and con tem plate
w h at G od w ants and w here G od is. This puts G od over against the other,
keeping m e from resp om ib ility for him , keeping G od static, keeping the
other from m eeting m e from on high, from being h im self m etaphysical.
Tevinas pleads w ith us to lo o k for the transcendent am ongst us, w ithin
the inter-personal, for on ly here w ill ethics be possib le. If transcendence is
locked ou tside o f our sensibility, outside o f our experiencing it, our only
op tion is to step back from the w orld ly reality o f r e s^ n s ib ility , ignoring
the other w h ile them atizing the beyond. Tevinas states,
The atheism of the m etaphysician means, positively, th at our relation w ith the
M etaphysical is an ethical behavior and not tbeology, not a tbem atization, be
it a knowledge by analogy, of tbe attributes of God. God rises to bis supreme
and ultim ate presence as correlative to the justice rendered unto men. The direct
comprebension of God is impossible for a look directed upon him, not because
our intelligence is limited, but because the relation w ith infinity respects the
total Transcendence of the other w ithout being bewitched by it, and because
our possibility of welcoming him in m an goes further th an the comprehension
that thematizes and encompasses its object.^

positive form in proximity, msponsibility and substitution. This makes it different from
the propositions of negative theology ... . In proximity, in signification, in my giving of
signs, already the Infinite speaks through the witness I bear of it, in my sincerity, in my
saying without said, preoriginary saying which is said in the mouth of the very one that
receives the witness.” Levinas, Otherwise, 151.
35 Ford gives us a helpful hint on how to read Levinas’s perspective at this point, helpful
because it keeps us from being too defensive: “To read Levinas with the prophets of
biblical Israel in mind is to be reminded of two of their main themes which am inseparably
interwoven: rejection of idolatry and passionate concern for right living with other
people. Levinas comes as near as possible to identifying the two, and his ‘ethics as first
philosophy’ is a rigourous critique of the way in which ‘idols’ of various sorts have so
fascinated and dominated the Western intellectual tradition and the civilisation which it
has helped to form that the result has been a devastation propensity for violence, murder
and war.” Ford, Self, 46.
36 Levinas, Totality, 78.
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L evinas’s concerns are w ell-fou n d ed and m ust n ot be ignored. From a
C hristian theological perspective, however, this begs the question w hether a
C hristological, trinitarian reading w o u ld n ot address m any o f his concerns,
and address them in a w ay that allow s for his m ethod , for his philosophy,
to stay intact. W ith this challenge before us, w e w ill turn to practical
th eologian Ray A nderson, seeing h o w his understanding o f th eo lo g y differs from the th eology that Levinas addresses and c r i t iq u e s .

A M o v e to Fractical T heology:
M inistry Leading to a Trinitarian T h eo lo g y
For A nderson, C hristian th eology is inseparable from C hristian ministry.
All th eology m ust be w ork ed ou t in the held o f m inisterial practice. H e
asserts, “M inistry can n ot be construed solely as the practical application
(or technique) w h ich m akes th eological k n ow led ge relevant and effective.
T h eological activity m ust em erge out o f m inistry and for the sake o f m inistry if it is to be in accordance w ith the divine m odality. T he ‘p ractice,’
o f ministry, then, is n ot on ly the appropriate co n tex t for d oing th eological
thinking, it is itself intrinsically a th eological activity.”^ A nderson can
m ake this assertion because o f his robust understanding o f the incarnation o f Jesus Christ. The m inistry o f C od to the w orld has com e in its
fullness in the hum anity o f Jesus Christ. T he concrete historical m inistry
o f Jesus Christ reveals to hum anity, unm ediated, the nature and person
o f C o d .^ This is n ot totalizin g but personal. C o d m eets hum anity in the
shared social reality. A nderson states,
Revelation does not exist between God and m an as an abstract entity which is
som ething else than either God or man, but exists as God himself exists - personally and concretely in relation w ith man. The possibility of know ing and
expressing the W ord of God in hum an thought-form s and in historical events
fellows upon the actuality of th at event in the incarnate life of Jesus . . . . If the
W ord of God stands only as an abstract or existential possibility, separated
from the historical context in w hich it originally came, then ... ministry ... will
have no ... content.”39

Jesus asserts, “W hoever has seen m e has seen the Father” and “T he Father and I are o n e .”40 The transcendent has n o w becom e historical and
37 Ray Anderson, A Theology for Ministry, in: Theological Foundations for Ministry, ed.
Ray Anderson, Edinburgh (T & T Clark) 17 ,  و7  و.
38 “A Christological perspective of ministry is that of ministry which has been accomplished
and which continues to be accomplished through the Roly Spirit, who indwells and
actualizes the life of the Church. To say that actuality precedes possibility, is to say that
God has actually given and upheld both sides of the ministry of the Word [which is
revelation and reconciliation].” Ibid., 17.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 John 14:9 and 10:30 (NRSV).
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w orldly. It rem ains eom p letely other, w h ile b eeom ing eom p letely for. The
C hristian church con fesses that C od n o w has a hum an face.41
W ith Jesus n o w resurrected, his m inistry con tinu es to be foun d only
in the historical, for death has been conquered a llow in g for con tinu ity
from century to century. In the trinitarian con fessio n o f the church, the
Spirit o f Christ con tinu es Jesus’ b odily m inistry, for Jesus is alive. It is
this con fession o f a living Christ, a m inistering Christ, that results in our
th eology being m ore than on tological claim s but instead gives equal priority to the ontic. It is the experience o f the ontic that shakes our th eo lo g y
loo se from sealed containers, calling us to lo o k a gain .^
The w orsh ip pin g com m unity partakes in the Spirit that propels b oth the
individual and com m un ity ou t into the w orld to do as its Lord d oes, to
give itself to and for the w orld , to m inister to its neighbor.43 T he Christian
is called to find Christ in the w orld , to find him , as Barth states, w ith his
fello w s,44 to find Jesus suffering for and lovin g the Other.45 To partake
in Christ, the C hristian m ust partake in the life o f the hum an other. In
Christ, revelation and recon ciliation are indivisibility linked. A nderson
therefore states, “Because the divine W ord and the hum an response are
reciprocally related, so that one can n ot be considered apart from the
other, revelation and recon ciliation participate in the sam e fundam ental
p arad igm .”46 This inseparability forces us deep into the hum an situ ation to

41 “Jesus’ facing of others is in line with his facing of God. It is above all about coraunicating
the good news of this God who is radically different from the God represented by most
people’s beliefs, fears, expectations and practices.” Ford, Self, 179.
42 Clifford Green states further: “If the proper question of Christology is ‘who is Jesus Christ?’
this is a question which can only be asked to the Christ who is present. Christology is
not concerned with an ideal of Christ nor with the historical influence of Christ, but
with the resurrected Christ, the living God, who is really present. Furthermore, Christ
is present as person not in isolation but only in relation to persons.” Clifford j. Green,
Bonhoeffer. A Theology of Sociality, Grand Rapids (William B. Eerdmanns Fublishing,
1999, 209.
43 “The Holy Spirit unites the doing of ministry to the ministry which has already been
accomplished in Christ, establishing a reciprocity between dogma and experientially
discloses and disciplines.” Anderson, A Theology, 8.
44 “ff we see Him alone, we do not see Him at all. ff we see Him, we see with and around
Him in ever-widening circles His disciples, the people, His enemies and the countless
millions who have not yet heard His name. We see Him as theirs, determined by them
and for them, belonging to each and every one of them .... What emerges in it is a
supreme I wholly determined by and to the Thou.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol.
III.2, Edinburgh (T & T Clark) 1960, 216.
45 “The community does not speak with words alone, ff speaks by the very fact of ffs
existence in the world; by its characteristic attitude to world problems; and, moreover
and especially, by its silent service to all the handicapped, weak, and needy in the world,
ff speaks, finally, hy the simple fact that ff prays for the world, ff does all this hecause this
is the purpose of ffs summons hy the Word of God.” Karl Barth, The Flace of Theology,
in: Theological Foundations for Ministry, ed. Ray Anderson, Edinhurgh ( 1 ^ 1 Clark)
1979,44.
46 Anderson, A Theology, 12.
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hear op en ly from the other, to see the dem and o f the other as the dem and
o f Christ. C hristian m inistry m ust give itself fully to the other w ith no
reservation, for C hristian m inistry is the m inistry o f Jesus w h o gives all
for hum anity. It is on ly in this eonstruet o f being for the other that I am
w ith Christ. T hus, it is on ly here that I ean do theology. It is a th eo lo g y
that is never distraeted from the faee o f the other, but in seeing, hearing,
and responding to the other, I diseover an ew (or again) the reality o f C od.
In the face o f the other I see the face o f Christ, never them atizing it as
such, but rather allow in g the other to rem ain him or herself.
T h eology m ust be done in d ialogue w ith this face, this face that is
the other w h o is m y historical concrete neighbor, unique and particular.
Surely there w ill be con tinu ity to the “past sto ry ” o f biblical revelation,
for it is the spirit o f Christ w h o is present in m y th eological m inisterial
act w ith the other.^ Yet even this “past story ” n o w breathes. It is m ore
than categorized history. M ore than the “sa id ,” it is the “sa y in g ,” for it
is n ot over, but con tinu es to con fron t m e, calling m e to understand anew
in light o f this stranger w h o is n o w near.48 This malees th eo lo g y and
ethics inseparable, for I discover and partake in the th eological only in
m y ob ed ien ce to the eth ical.4 ؟O ne is left to w ond er if L evinas’s th ou ght
m ight n ot com p lem en t the foregoin g^ w h en he says.

47 “ [W]hen theological thinking is practiced in abstraction from tbe Cburcb in ministry,
it inevitably becomes as much unapplied and irrelevant as pure. When the theological
mind of the minister is being educated primarily through experience, an ad boc theology
emerges wbicb owes as mucb (or more) to metbodological and pragmatic concerns as to
dogma. Tbe task of working out a theology for ministry begins properly with the task of
identifying the nature and place of ministry itself.” Anderson, A Tbeology, 7. 1 cannot
make tbeology only dogmatic categorization, nor can 1 refuse to think theoretically
and tbeologically if Jesus Cbrist is the criterion for ministry, for in His person tbey are
united.
48 “As Cbrist’s own ministry is unfolded and proclaimed, the Cburcb discovers its own
ministry, and its members their own particular ministry. Christ continually discloses his
ministry in concrete situations. This disclosure is the source of all true innovation and
creativity in ministry. Tbus, dogma does not stifle but stimulates creativity.” Ibid., 8.
49 “As a theological discipline, the hermeneutical task of the Cburcb is to continue to search
out and seek to be conformed to the hermeneutical structure of revelation itself, as given
in Holy Scripture. Thus, the ministry of the Cburcb necessarily involves theological
reflection and a correction of its own inevitable tendencies to create ministry for its own
justification.” Ibid., 19. This warning is avoided if theology sees its tasks as incarnational,
and thus inseparable from ethics.
50 Here David Ford shows the different perspectives of theologian Eberhard Jüngel and
Levinas: “ff would he possihle to ameliorate the tension if Jüngel did not affirm one
person, Jesus Christ, as tbe incarnation of God and therefore as tbe particular one who
is there for all otbers. As it is, the extremism of Levinas seeing ‘me’ suhstituting for
all confronts Jüngel’s extremism of seeing ‘Jesus Christ’ suhstituting for all.” Eord, On
Substitution, 32. Tbis quote shows wbere Levinas would have a prohlem whb earlier
Cbristological discussion. Yet wbat 1 am proposing, following Levinas, is that one is
personally called to complete substitution for tbe Other. Unlike Levinas, 1 am asserting
that 1 can only receive tbe power to do so (and to keep the act from heing some kind
masochistic self-fulfillment) in following Jesus Christ wbo meets me and partakes whb
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The w ork of justice - the uprightness of the face to face - is necessary in order that the breach th at leads to G od be produced . . . . Hence metapbysics is
enacted wbere tbe social relation is enacted - in our relations w itb men. Tbere
can be no “know ledge” of G od separated from the relationsbip w ith men.
The O tber is the very locus of metapbysical trutb, and is indispensable for my
relation w ith God. He does not play the role of a mediator. The O tber is not
the incarnation of God, but precisely by bis face, in w hich be is disincarnate,
is the m anifestation of the beigbt in wbicb G od is revealed. It is our relations
with men, wbicb describe a field of research hardly glimpsed at ... th at give
to theological concepts the sole signification they adm it of.51

We have had this C hristologieal eon versation m ostly behind T evinas’s
baek. We m ust n o w turn our eon versation m ore direetly to him . Ford
states w h at m ay be T evinas’s ultim ate eoneern in sueh a C hristologieal
reading, “In the com p lex o f responsibilities, w h a t w orries Tevinas m ost
ab out the c o s - c e n t e r e d p osition ... is that som eh o w C hristianity involves
a shifting o f r e s ^ n s ib ility on to that m an on the cross, and an infinite
pardon w h ich eneourages ir r e s ^ m ib ility .”^ To sh o w that this need n ot
be, I turn n o w to D ietrich Bonhoeffer, putting him in a m ore direct conversation w ith Tevinas. Before this is possib le, how ever, it is im portant to
see h o w B onhoeffer can be und erstood as a practical theologian .

B onhoeffer as a R epresentative P r a c t ic a l T h e o l o g i a n
D ietrich B onhoeffer began to w rite his doctoral dissertation in th eo lo g y
at the U niversity o f Berlin at the age o f nineteen. H e w o u ld finish it at
tw en ty-on e. T he project (w hich becam e his first b o o k , Sanctorum C o m munio) discussed the em pirical reality o f the C hristian church, putting
sociological theory and dogm atic th eology in dialogue. The dissertation
w as n ot inspired by his o w n attendance and participation in the church
(he rarely if ever w en t), but cam e from his ob servation w hile on h olid ay
in R om e o f the pilgrim s m aking their w ay to the V atican. From his obser

me in this act. Ford continues giving us further clues to what Levinas’s response might
be to this Christologieal reading: “Levinas is just as hostile as Jüngel to what they both
see as the traditional theological concept of analogy leading to a negative apophatic
theology, but he does not entertain Jüngel’s singular event of the incarnation through
which to construct an alternative. Faith in the event ofthe incarnation (interpreted through
the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ) is for Jüngel the source of confidence in the
capacitiation of our language ever anew in parabolic forms. ‘Similarity’ for him means
the inexhaustible expressibility of the mystery of this event, God genuinely being offered
in human expression. Levinas, for all his more agonistic and self-deconstructing language
and his refusal to talk of similarity, yet pivots his philosophy around a proximity, a
coming near, an approach which is also inexhaustibly fruitful.” Ford, Self, 78.
51 Levinas, Totality, 79.
52 Ford, Self, 59.
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vation o f this practice, he ^ a s m oved to construct a theory.53 w h a t w as
the church and h o w w as its d ogm atic doctrinal understanding con n ected
to it em pirical sociological reality? w h e r e w as Christ concretely found
w ithin it? H o w cou ld this be justified sociologically? O ne tod ay m ay be
tem pted w ith g o o d reason to call this a practical th eological project, both
because o f its em pirical starting p oin t and its interdisciplinary m eth od ology. B on hoeffer’s project began w ith w h at Brow ning calls the starting
p oin t and central m ove o f practical theology, asking, w h a t is goin g on
here? W hat is happening?^
B onhoeffer spent the academ ic year o f 1 3 0  وin N e w York C ity at
U n ion T h eological Seminary, w here he w as influenced greatly by fello w
student Frank Fisher, an A frican-A m erican. Fisher ex p o sed B onhoeffer
firsthand both to the hardships o f Blacks in H arlem (and elsew here) and
to the vibrant w orsh ip style in A fr in -A m e r ic a n storefront churches.
W hen B onhoeffer returned to Cerm any, he w as changed. H e w as n o w
m ore interested in pastoral th eological thou ght than system atic or philosophical theology. After returning from N e w York, B onhoeffer k n ew m ore
poignan tly that th eology cou ld on ly be discovered in the practice and
action o f m inistry. “ Can th eologian s think, speak, and w rite th eologically
unless they really live in the decisive history o f hum anity w h ich is n o w
being made? D are w e speak o f the activity o f the living C o d in history
unless w e ourselves are part o f that action? W h at w ill w e be able to say
ab out the ethical, political, and psychic issues o f hum anity tod ay unless
w e live in this p sych o-social reality?
B onhoeffer did n ot abandon his d eveloped th eo lo g y o f sociality but saw
m ore clearly h o w it related to practice, using it as an arrow to strike at the
heart o f the political situ ation facing C erm any and the C hristian church.
Fastor B onhoeffer n o w put all his energy into constructing th eological
con cepts that addressed C hristian practice and action in the real w orld ,
a w orld that calls for action and r e s^ n s ib ility , i.e., for eth ics.^ H is n ext
projects addressed obedience in discipleship (The C o s t o f D isc ip le sh ip ),

53 Practical theology is often understood as interdisciplinary in nature. Clifford Green shows
here how Bonhoeffer’s work from the start was interdisciplinary. “The interdisciplinary
method in Sanctorum Communio, then, is identical with that employed in the next work,
Act and Being. Bonhoeffer appreciates and appropriates insights found in non-theological
disciplines. But he is perfectly clear and confident about his method as a theologian. The
ultimate criterion is the revelation in Christ. This combination of theological confidence,
which manifests his indebtedness to Barth, and intellectual openness, which reflects his
Berlin upbringing and education, is refreshing indeed in the theological scene of the late
1920 in Germany.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 27.
54 Don S. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology. Descriptive and Strategic Proposals,
Minneapolis (Fortress Press) 1991, ch. 3.
55 Green, Bonhoeffer, 293.
56 “This integration of theology and life is partly what Bonhoeffer had in mind when he
wrote of finding Christ at the center of life in the world, of sharing the sufferings of
God, and of learning to have faith hy living completely in our history.” Ihid., 294.
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the praetiees o f C hristian eom m un ity (Prayer B o o k o f the Bible and Life
T ogether), and ethies speeifieally (Ethics). T h eo lo g y for B onhoeffer w as
eonstruetive from the start, and its m om entum grew as his years and w riting progressed. Seeing his th eology as interdiseiplinary, praetiee-oriented,
m inistry-foeused, and in ter^ etively-d ireeted , it seem s befitting to elaim
him as a practical theologian .

B onhoeffer in C onversation w ith Tevinas
T h eology and C hristology need n ot lead us aw ay from substitutionary
ethies, as Tevinas fears. Instead, they have the p otential to lead us deeper
into sueh aetion, to engender responsible ethies for-the-other. W e w ill see
this p ossib ility in B on hoeffer’s th eology o f sociality.
Ethics for Tevinas is n ot based on tologica lly in a totality o f right
and w ron g, but is discovered in the soeial interaetion o f I and the other,
o f the one being eom p letely for-the-other. B onhoeffer h im self begins his
th eological project elsew here than striet th eologieal d iseussions o f o n to ؛ogy, elsew here than epistem ology. H e begins, like Tevinas, in the social
situ ation , asking in the co n tex t o f this social reality, w h o is Jesus Christ?
W here is Jesus Christ? H o w then m ust I act?^
Eor B onhoeffer as for Tevinas, ethics is em bedded w ith in his anthropology. To be hum an is to act ethically. T he “I” for B onhoeffer is just
as distinct as the enjoying I o f Tevinas. T he individual m ust be an egoist
for the possib ility o f ethics for Tevinas. For Bonhoeffer, he m ust exist in
a dynam ic relationahty w here he is both op en to and closed to the other.
For the I to be open to another, it m ust discover itself in its distinction,
in its closed ness. For one to be open, one m ust be closed . She m ust drag
her fo o t in the sand, form ing a line and stating, “This is m e and that is
y o u .” O ne m ust k n o w herself as an I, a subject different from all others.^
Bonhoeffer states, “T hus the ‘op en n ess’ o f the person dem ands ‘closed n ess’
as a correlative, or one cou ld n ot speak o f openness at a ll .”و

57 “Theology imprudently treats the idea of the relation between God and tbe creature in
terms of ontology. It presupposes the logical privilege of totality, as a concept adequate
to being. Tbus it runs up against the difficulty of understanding that an infinite being
would border on or tolerate something outside of itself, or that a free being would send its
roots into the infinity of a God.” Levinas, Totality, 293. It seems to me that Bonboeffer’s
theology avoids the overempbasis on ontology of which Levinas accuses the discipline.
58 “The otber person is a real Grenze to the I, a limit to the dominating ambitions of the
self; the other person is also, as embodying the Word of forgiveness ab extra, the promise
and possibility of the self’s liberation into a new existence .... It is only because Cbrist
is present as person tbat the self acknowledges the other as a genuine person and not
as an entity or merely extant tbing.” Green, Bonboeffer, 89.
59 Dietrich Bonboeffer, Sanctorum Communio. A Theological Study of the Sociology of
the Cburcb, Minneapolis (Fortress Fress) 1963, 74.
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For  ظ0  ضLevinas and B onhoeffer, p h ilo so p h y or th eo lo g y begins
w ith a distinct and differentiated self. For Levinas, the ground for fois
distinction is the irrefutable p h en om en on o f the self. For Bonhoeffer, it
is p h n o m e n o lo g ic a l, but also th e o lo g ica l.^ In foe C hristological understanding o f Christ as the n ew hum anity, w h ich con fron ts and op poses all
that dehum anizes, the hum an is given back the self. H e is n o w free to be
him self, free from the b ondage o f both the self and the other, n o w free
to enter into free relationality w ifo the other,61 or in L evinas’s w ord s, to
partake in transcendent infinity.
This d i f f e r e n t i a t e d self leads both L e v i n a s and B onhoeffer to the t r a m
scendent, into relationship w ifo the m etap h ysical.^ Levinas locates both
the p h ilosop h ical and the m etaphysical w ith in the w orld . In encountering
the face o f the other, one encounters the transcendent. B onhoeffer asserts
m uch the sam e.^ The transcendence o f C od is n o w a historical transcendence, for it has em bedded itself in the hum anity o f Jesus C hrist,^ the

60 Green continues my point: “The phenomenology of transcendence in sociality is that
Christ present as person in the other encounters me in the Word; the Word questions my
existence by asking me about my love for the neighbor. [...] The present Christ encounters
tbe self wbose false social existence is witbin a solidarity of isolated selves, eacb being a
cor curvum in se, beau turned in upon itself (Tutber). His Word of judgment and grace
liberates the egocentric self for the love of the neigbbor, thus creating the mutuality
of freedom and love for one another in the community of the new bumanity.” Green,
Bonboeffer. 216.
61 “Two fundamental assertions are being made in this theological view of human social
relationships. First, God is the one wbo establisbes the otber as You in relation to the
self, tbus constituting the self as a person. Second, God is the divine You wbo encounters
the self in the etbical limit and claim of the buman ‘other,’ ‘God is a You for us, that is,
active will standing over against us.’ Tbese two assertions cannot really be separated;
since transcendence is to be understood in terms of sociality, tbey are two aspects of the
one relationsbip.” Ibid., 36.
62 “ [T]he person is willed by God, in concrete vitality, wholeness, and uniqueness as an
ultimate unity. Social relations must be understood, then, as purely interpersonal and
building on the uniqueness and separateness of persons .... Thus the way to the other
person’s You is the same as the way to the divine You, eitber tbrougb acknowledgment or
rejection.” Bonboeffer, Sanctorum, 55. This statement sbows bis connection to Levinas in
seeing the human botb as distinct (making responsibility possible) and transcendent.
63 “A God invisible means not only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice.
Ethics is the spiritual optics.” Levinas, Totality, 78. Bonhoeffer would agree.
64 Both Bonhoeffer and Levinas have a kind of atheistic theism. We have discussed ahove
how Levinas has placed the transcendence of God so far outside of human contact and
manipulation that be claims no correlation hetween God’s heing and our own. Ford has
called Levinas a prophetic voice, like tbose in the Old Testament, speaking out against
idolatry. Bonboeffer also feared a kind of theistic idolatry in which God hecame a stop
gap. One of bis most puzzling and intriguing statements from Tegel prison is addressed
to this concern. He states: “And we cannot he bonest unless we recognize that we bave
to live in the world esti deus non duretur [even if there were no Godj. And tbis is just
what we do recognize - hefore God! God himself compels us to recognize it ... . God
would bave us know that we must live as men who manage our lives witbout him. The
God wbo lets us live in the world without the working bypotbesis of God is the God
before whom we stand continually. Before God and with God we live without God.”
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hum anity o f G o d .^ The spirit o f Christ, the H o ly Spirit, is n o w present in
the soeial relationality o f the ehureh in the w orld , o f the individual Christian and his neighbor.^ In eneountering m y neighbor, I am eneountering
C hrist, the transeendent, for G od has bound the divine self to hum anity.
T he reeon eiliation o f hum anity to G od is u niversal.^ w h e n e v e r I m eet
m y neighbor in his d istin etion ,^ affirm ing and respeeting the boundary
that separates the other from m e and affirm ing his o w n enjoying self, I
m eet C hrist . وغW h e n I refuse to totalize the o t h e r but stand v u l n e r a b l e in
the w on d er o f the other’s infinity, I m eet Christ.™ This is n ot beeause the
other’s I is transubstantiated into Christ. Instead, in m utual relationality
I partake, as does the other on m y behalf, in the m inistry o f Christ that
is giving unique partieularity to the subjeet in the eom m un ity o f the n ew
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, New York (Macmillan Publishing
Co.) 1360 ,53  و. Bonboeffer’s understanding of God, much like Levinas’s, does not keep
us from action, suffering, and service, but encounters God only in it, only there revealing
God’s wonder.
“For Bonhoeffer, then, transcendence does not refer to an inaccessible otherness or
heyondness of God; it refers to the present Christ. But the present Christ is ‘other,’ ‘outside’
tbe self, in sucb a way tbat be cannot be drawn into tbe dominating power of tbe selfsufficient ego. It is as person tbat Christ is ‘other,’ ‘outside’ tbe self. Christology states
its presupposition about “transcendence, namely, that the Logos is person. This human
being is the transcendent.” [...] But the Word embodied in another person stands over
against the self; eacb person, as an independent willing subject, is a Grenze to the other.
Word in tbe form of person means a personal address which encounters and cballenges
tbe self from without. Just as freedom is not an attribute of God’s aseity but of God’s
way of relating to humanity, so transcendence is not an attribute of Cffiisuin-himself
but a relationship of Christ whose Personstruktur is a pro-me-Sein. He is pro nobis as
extra nos. The form of transcendence is therefore human sociality: the Word embodied
in the other person and addressed to me as person is simultaneously extra me and pro
me.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 215.
“Wboever professes to believe in the reality of Jesus Christ, as tbe revelation of God,
must in the same breath profess his faith in botb their reality of God and the reality of
tbe world; for in Christ he finds God and the world reconciled .... Belonging wholly to
Cbrist, be stands at tbe same time wholly in the world.” Dietricb Bonboeffer, Christ, the
Cburcb, and tbe World, in: Theological Foundations for Ministry, ed. Ray Anderson,
Edinhurgh ( T & T Clark) 1979, 544.
“In Christ bumanity really is drawn into community with God, just as in Adam humanity
fell. And even tbougb in tbe one Adam there are many adams, yet there is only Christ.
For Adam is ‘representative human heing’, hut Christ is tbe Lord of his new bumanity.”
Bonboeffer, Snctorum , 146.
“In other words, one person cannot know tbe other, hut can only acknowledge and
‘helieve’ in tbe other.” Ihid., 54. Bonhoeffer’s statement here sbows tbat he is not thinking
of tbe other in a concept of totalization.
“Accordingly, Bonhoeffer understands tbe Word of Christ to he bistorical, in the sense
that it encounters people, calling for responsihle decision; tbis encounter occurs in human
social relations, and, since the bistoricity of human Existenz consists of decision in this
social-etbical encounter witb otbers in community, historicity and sociality are intrinsic
to each otber.” Green, Bonboeffer, 223.
“Tbis ‘existing for others’ which people encounter in Jesus is notbing other tban encounter
witb authentic transcendence.” Ihid., 273.
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hum anity.71 For Bonhoeffer, lovin g the other  طn ot sim ply loving Christ,
as if I eou ld say, “I hate him , but love Jesus in h im  ”؛B onhoeffer states,
“I do n ot love C od in the ‘neighbor,’ but I love the eonerete Y ou ؛I love
the You by plaeing m yself, m y entire w ill, in the serviee o f the Y o u .”72
T his p ossib ility o f e o m ^ r tm e n ta liz a tio n (I hate you , but love Jesus
in y o u  )؛is exaetly w h at Levinas fears in a C hristologieal perspeetive. It
is on ly theology, Levinas w o u ld assert, that allow s one to malee sueh a
statem ent. It is th eology that gives eategories to hum anity, keeping one
from the faee o f the other. The transeendent for Bonhoeffer, how ever, is
in the historieal. It is this-w orldly, n ot otherw orldly. This m eans for Bonhoeffer that loving the other is lovin g the other. T he eall o f Christ is first
to the w orld , in m eeting the other as, and only as, the other. I partake in
Christ n ot as a third party, but as I and other shared relationality, as the
spirit o f soeiality, as the objeetive spirit.73 It is here in the objeetive spirit
that Christ is present, n ot as a p ossessed entity, but as an infinity. If I
totalize the other in seeing her, denying her infinity, the soeial or objeetive
spirit that eon n eets us as a soeiologieal reality is degraded and beeom es
destruetive. The objeetive reality o f our sociality is totalization . I state
u pon seeing her, for exam p le, “T h at’s a w o m a n thing to do. I k n o w h o w
p eop le like you think. T h at’s a typical M exica n a ttitu d e.” In the objective spirit o f totalization , Christ can n ot be found. From to ta liza tio n is
bred hatred, violenee, and d eh um anization, all w h ich the m inistry o f the
historical Christ op poses, w h e r e the objective spirit o f our relationality
is infinite, how ever, w here I am open to see an ew and again this other
before m e and share in her hum anity, Christ is present (m aking th eo lo g y
possib le). We together share in the m inistry o f Christ, w h ich is the hum anization o f hum anity, o f com m unity, in the n ew hum anity .7 هT herefore
71 Green continues this point of Bonhoeffer’s: “Christ is interpreted as present in human
form in the matrix of social relationships; his presence is the reality of the universal
new humanity, in its corporate and individual dimensions, and the Christian community
is the community of persons where the reality of the new humanity of Christ becomes
actual in the social world.” Ibid., 183.
72 Bonhoeffer, Snctorum , 16  و.
73 “Objective spirit is thus to be regarded as the connection between historical and communal
meaning, between the temporal and spatial intentions of a community. Objective spirit
is will exerting itself effectively on members of the community.” Ibid., 99. Bonhoeffer
continues: “It leads an individual life ‘beyond’ the individual persons, and yet it is real
only through them. The more alive the individual persons, the more powerful the objective
spirit. It interacts reciprocally with each individual and with them all. To withdraw from
it is to withdraw from the community. It wills historical continuity as well as the social
realization of its will.” Ibid., 100.
74 For Levinas, it is language that bridges the infinity of the 1 and the other. For Bonhoeffer,
language is also significant. For both, it is the vehicle to meet the other. Levinas states: “In
the approach of a face the flesh becomes word, the caress a saying.” Levinas, Otherwise,
94. For Bonhoeffer, however, it is given a more nuanced theological understanding.
For there to be true human interaction to the depth of ethical substitution, the Word
of God must be present in one’s community of shared relationality. This kerygma can
come in many different forms, but when it comes from the other, it comes as the Word
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for Bonhoeffer, it is Christ that allow s the 1 to see the other, for the 1 to
recognize the infinity o f the neighbor.75
W orldly transcendence is equally im portant for both Eevinas and
Bonhoeffer. For both m en, it leads to ethics. If p h ilo so p h y is totalizin g,
it w ill lead to violence and war. If th eology Is otherw orldly, it w ill lead to
com p lian ce and in action , easily m olded to the sttucture o f p ow er ideology, and becom e m eaningless. For one to be saved from a p h ilosop h y o f
violence or a th eology o f m eaninglessness, one m ust be w illin g to enter
into su bstitution for the other. O ne m ust be w illin g to stand in for the
other, acquiring guilt for the other, giving the very fo o d from his m outh to
the other. In B on hoeffer’s w ord s, one m ust becom e deputy for the other.
“T he father acts for the children, w ork in g for them , caring for them ,
fighting and suffering for them . Thus in a real sense he is their deputy ... .
D eputyship ... r e s^ n s ib ility , lies on ly in the com p lete surrender o f o n e ’s
ow n life to the other m an . ” 7ة
To live the C hristian life, to partake in theology, to do true p h ilosophy, to avoid totalization , one m ust delve deep into the life o f the other,
so deep that one is w illin g to suffer for the other and to suffer from the
other. It is only in this incarnational entering, Fevinas w o u ld assert (though
m eaning it in a n on -th eological w ay), that ethics and p h ilo so p h y are possible. For Bonhoeffer, it is only in the responsibility o f acquired guilt that
ethics and th eology are possib le. W ith ou t it, p h ilo so p h y becom es im possible because it detaches itself from the m etaphysical. C hristian th eo lo g y
becom es im possible becom es it detaches itself from Jesus Christ. “If any
m an tries to escape guilt in resp om ib ility he detaches h im self from the
ultim ate reality o f hum an existence, and w h a t is m ore he cuts h im self o ff
from the redeem ing m ystery o f C hrist’s bearing guilt w ith o u t sin and he
has no share in the divine justification w h ich lies u pon this ev en t.”77
of God that places such a demand upon me that 1 cannot 1 ﻛﻠﻬﻪaway without being in
disobedience. Green explains Bonboeffer’s position further: “Christ is present as Word
in tbe form of living address between persons. ... Christ is person, and he encounters
us in the word of address from anotber human person, tbat is, in the sermon. Word in
the form of address requires a hearer and a responsible answer. But this means that the
Word is an event in community.” Green, Bonboeffer, 213.
73 Green explains Bonboeffer’s perspective furtber: “Transcendence is not Cod’s otherness
beyond humanity and above the world; the holy, creating, sustaining, and reconciling
love of God which is revealed in Cbrist is God’s lordsbip in the world among buman
beings . ... God is present in the encounter of individuals and their communities as
Kollektivpersonen. The ‘otber,’ as individual person and corporate person, is the ‘form’
in wbicb God is really present as the divine O tb e r’ in the world. Transcendence in
Bonhoeffer’s tbeology of sociality, tben, is socio-etbical transcendence, ffs form is the
social form of human personal life, and its content and goal is to create and redeem
community between human beings and Cbrist and among human beings themselves.”
Ibid., 64. He adds: “The sociality of the Word in the address-encounters between persons
in community means that the other person, as an etbical subject in community, is the
form of both the otherness and the presence of Cbrist.” Ibid., 213.
76 Bonhoeffer, Christ, 54  و.
77 Ibid., 561.
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Both Levinas and B onhoeffer m ust m ove to this extrem e and uneom fortable p o sition . If the transeendent is historieal and foun d in the
relational eon n eetion o f I and the other, and if p h ilo so p h y and th eo lo g y
are found on ly here, then one m ust be w illin g to give all in relationality
to the other. To refuse su bstitution , to refuse to stand in for-the-other and
give all to the other, is to be a hypoerite.
W hat is su bstitution , thou gh, and w h at does it m ean to be for-theother? Levinas ean give exam p les o f w h at this kind o f aetion m ay lo o k
like and w h at it m ight m ean. In the end, how ever, it seem s to o heavy
a burden to earry, to o speeulative to direet m e truly, to o lon ely to be
possib le. It rings as p ow erfully true but seem s to o slippery to grasp. A
substitutionary exam ple w o u ld be helpful. B onhoeffer can give just such
an exam p le in the person and m inistry o f Jesus Christ.
It is Jesus w h o is the true subsitutionary figure. In fo llo w in g Jesus,
I find m yself being for-the-other. M ore than just an exam p le, this is a
call for vicarious action. I act w ith m y w h o le self but find the source o f
m y p ow er to act beyond m yself. It rem ains m yself that I risk - it is m y
fo o d I provide, it is m y tim e I give - but in giving it I n ot only partake
unm ediated w ith m y neighbor, but unm ediated w ith the Spirit o f Christ,
w h o em p ow ers and accom panies m e in this ethical a ct.78 In the vicarious
p ow er o f Jesus Christ and his present power, I go to the other, I stand
com p letely for-the-other .7و
A love which left man alone in his guilt would not be love for tbe real man. As
one wbo acts responsibly in the bistorical existence of men Jesus becomes guilty.
It must be emphasized that it is solely His love which makes him incur guilt ....
It is as the one wbo is without sin that Jesus takes upon Himself the guilt of His
brotbers, and it is under the burden of this guilt that He shows Himself to be
without sin. In this Jesus Christ, wbo is guilty without sin, lies the origin of every
action of responsible deputyship.o

An ethic o f s u b s t i t u t i o n to the radical extent that Levinas envisions it
m ay only be p ossib le from a th eological perspective.^!
78 Bonhoeffer further discusses the extent to wbicb one is responsibility must lead, but
he also shows that the power to do sucb is engendered by the grace of God: “Wben
a man takes guilt upon bimself in responsibility, and no responsible man can avoid
this, he imputes this guilt to himself and to no one else; be answers for it; he accepts
responsibility for it. He does not do this in the insolent presumptuousness of his own
power, but he does it in the knowledge tbat tbis liberty is forced upon him and that in
this liberty he is dependent on grace. Before other men the man of free responsibility is
justified by necessity; before himself he is acquitted by his conscience; but before God
he hopes only for mercy.” Ibid., 566.
79 “This is why the principle of vicarious representative action can become fundamental
for the clucl^com m unity of God in and though Christ. N ot ‘solidarity,’ which is never
possible between Christ and human beings, but vicarious representative action is the
life-principle of the new humanity.” Bonhoeffer, S nctorum , 146-147.
80 Bonhoeffer, Christ, 561.
81 “In maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of substitution
for others and suffering both from the effect of persecution and from the persecuting
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Substitution at this level happens w ithin a deeper understanding o f
eom m un ity than allow ed for by Levinas. L evinas’s d iseussion o f ethies
rem ains on ly interpersonal. H e is skeptieal o f larger soeial units. D oub tfu l
that they ean truly aet ethieally, he believes their w ill is to o divided to
eseape self-interest. B on hoeffer’s w h o le projeet, how ever, is direeted to the
com m unity. H e h olds that the com m un ity can act ethically, both m em ber
to m em ber and church G em e in d e to another G e m e in d e . B onhoeffer can
assert this both because o f his so c io lo g ic a l/a n th ro p o lo g ic a l understanding
o f com m un ity and because o f his th eological com m itm ents. B onhoeffer asserts that the social com m un al spirit interacts w ith other com m un ities just
as the individual spirit interacts w ith other in dividu als.82 “Every con cept
o f com m un ity is essentially related to a con cept o f person. It is im possible to say w h at con stitutes com m un ity w ith o u t asking w h at con stitutes
a p e r s o n . H e r e , to o , the com m un ity m ust be a distinct enjoying (worshipping) com m unity, unique from all others in its rituals. These rituals
o f w orsh ip m ust be arcane, as B onhoeffer w o u ld assert, n ot dividing us
from other com m un ities but preparing us for action on their behalf. The
com m unity, just like the individual, m ust be open and closed to all others,
distinct from the w orld but com p letely open to it. Eor Bonhoeffer, this is
p ossib le th eologically because Jesus Christ n o w exists as K ollectivperson .
H e exists in the m idst o f our individual and com m un al relations b oth in
the com m un ity and in the w orld . If the com m un ity is “in C hrist,” if it
is experiencing life in the K ollec tiv p erso n o f Jesus, it m ust con tinu e to
crucify its o w n self-interest, binding closer together in one w ill, risking
its very existence in reaching out ethically to the w orld.
Substitionary ethics done as K ollectivperson seem s m uch m ore plausible
in practical life.84 W hen I am personally con fron ted for help by m y drug-

itself in which the persecutor sinks. Maternity, which is bearing par excellence, bears
even responsibility for tbe persecuting by the persecutor.” Levinas, Otberwise, 73. Tbis
quote of Levinas begs for a Christological reading, and peering at it through Bonhoeffer,
we can see its possibilities.
82 Green deepens my point: “Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of person, it is imperative to
understand, is a concept which is corporate as well as individual. This clearly distinguisbes
his position from philosophers and theologians such as Martin Buber, Eberhard Grisebach,
Eriedrich Gogarten, and Emil Brunner. These thinkers made much of the concept ofperson,
and of the I-You relation - wbicb Bonboeffer also uses. But the concept of the person
in tbeir work remains an individual concept, since its locus is in the relation between
individuals as 1 and You; tberefore their positions could be described as inter-personal
personalism. Bonhoeffer goes beyond this usage in a quite original way to sbow tbat
the concept of the person is fruitful for understanding corporate buman communities,
and the relation of individuals to tbem .” Green, Bonboeffer, 30.
83 Bonboeffer, Sanctorum, 34.
84 “ [RJeciprocity between individual and corporate life wbicb is essential in Bonboeffer’s
understanding of sociality; it forgets that the ethical is intrinsic to the definition of ‘person.’
The very reason be applies to communities his own model of the buman person is to
guarantee that tbey are understood to bave the same etbical-bistorical cbaracter as the
individual person . ... Corporate communities as sucb, pace still prevalent ideologies.
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addicted relative w h o needs a ^lace to stay after being evicted from his
a ^ r tm e n t, 1 m ust n ot turn from his need. A lthou gh it is in con ven ien t and
p otentially dangerous, I m ust give all to the other. A nother also con fron ts
m e, how ever: m y o w n sm all child, w h o dem ands a safe and calm environm ent in w h ich to grow. I am stuck b etw een the dem and o f tw o op p osed
others. It is in this bind that I need the com m unity, for w e together are
called to substitution. We as K ollec tiv p erson en can act w ith o u t hesitation. I w ill find a bed for him in the h om e o f one in the com m unity, n ot
m aking him their problem , but together (as a com m unity) sharing in his
need, acting for him ethically. It is then in this ethical act, as com m unity,
for the other, that w e together enter into m inistry and do theology.

C onclusion: Levinas, ?ractical T h eology,
and Social Ethical ^ s p o m ib ilit y
Through this study, w e have seen that an understanding o f C hristian theology as practical theology, as a discipline engendered from the practice
o f m inistry in the presence o f the historically transcendent C o d and the
infinite neighbor, has the possib ility o f avoiding the critical dangers that
Levinas perceives w ith theology. This opens to those in the field o f practical th eology the depth o f L evinas’s th ou ght as a resource and direction
in constructing p raxis-oriented th eologies. M ore im portantly, it sh ow s
the p h ilosop h ical necessity o f practice leading to theory, o f p h ilo so p h y as
ethical action, “^ e -o n e -fo r -th e -o th e r is the fou n d ation o f theory, for it
m akes p ossib le relationship ... . ”85 Levinas has sh o w n us that this relationship is w ith the m etaphysical. To do p hilosophy, one m ust em brace the
m etaphysical, and the m etaphysical can on ly be found in the historical
existence o f the hum an other. This clears the ground, sh ow in g that the
place o f theoretical con stru ction can on ly be alon gsid e the neighbor.
By reading Levinas alongside Bonhoeffer, w e can see h o w social ethical
r e s^ n s ib ility is theologically justified and, at p oints, m ade m ore accessible.
Eor both Levinas and Bonhoeffer, w e on ly experience the transcendent
w hen w e step out and give ourselves totally to our neighbor, to the other.
In d oing so, the divine and the hum an are so fused that to deal w ith the
one is to deal w ith the other. B onhoeffer has m ade this even m ore concrete

are not ethically neutral; they are ethical ‘bodies’ as mucb as tbe individual person.
Accordingly, this corporate use of the concept of person insists tbat individuals are not
private persons but people wbo bave responsibility for the socio-ethical life of their
communities; to use ‘person’ also as a corporate concept is to remind individuals that tbeir
personal life essentially includes a corporate dimension .... Indeed, since tbere can be no
Kollektivperson apart from a community of individual persons, it is in individual persons
that the call to corporate, etbical responsibility is heard.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 42.
85 Levinas, Otberwise, 136.
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by sh ow in g h o w Jesus Christ is the transeendent other that m eets us in
the historieal ethieal aetion o f I and other. In this ethieal aet, p h ilosop h y
and th eology beeom e possib le, for they avoid being on ly pedantie (and
at w orst, destruetive) exereises, im portant to on ly a few tueked aw ay
in the dam p eorners o f libraries. Rather, if w e are w illin g to see soeial
ethical action as a paradigm for practical theology, w e w ill be thrust out
into the bright light o f the lived w orld , to construct th eo lo g y together in
our m inistry, as a collective com m unity, alongside the other w h o calls,
together serving and suffering for the w orld.

Z s a m m e n fa s su n g
In ihrer Bezugnahme auf konkrete M enschen und die jeweiligen Kontexte, in denen
sie leben, vollziebt sieb Theologie in einem kontinuierlicben Prozess der Anpassung
und des Übergangs. N ach Ansicht des Verfassers ist darum auch die theologische Reflexion ^ a rram tlic h e r Praxis stets in einem engen Z sa m m e n h a n g mit den ethischen
H andlungsvollzügen zu seben, die den A nderen als den nahen oder fernen N äcbsten
in den Blick nehmen. Diese Tbese w ird im Rabm en einer Analyse der Pbilosopbie von
Emmanuel Levinas entwickelt. Dabei w erden zunächst die Grundzüge seines Denkens
dargestelh und gerade auch die V orbebahe Levinas’ gegenüber der Theologie nam haft
gemacht. Sodann sucht der Verfasser zu zeigen, dass und wie eine Theologie, die sieb
prinzipiell als Praktische Theologie im Sinne einer Tbeologie mit und für den Anderen
begreife, viele Befürchtungen von Levinas hinsichtlich der Tbeologie relativieren könne,
und dass sein D enken für Praktische Tbeologen überaus anregend sei. tim diese Thesen
zu unterm auern, bringt der Verfasser Levinas’ Philosophie und Dietricb Bonboeffers
Theologie m iteinander ins Gespräch, wobei sich viele A bnhcbkeüen zeigen und zugleich
deutheb w ird, wie sieb Levinas’ Einwände gegenüber der Theologie mit Hilfe von
Bonhoeffers theologischen Einsichten entkräften lassen. Der Aufsatz sebheßt mit der
Eorderung, den Aspekt der sozialetbiscben Verantw ortung, deren prinzipielle Bedeutung
von Levinas und Bonboeffer gleichermaßen hervorgehohen w orden sei, als ein zentral
wichtiges Paradigma praktiscb-tbeologiscber Arheit zu hegreifen.
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